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STATEMENT OF COVR^T OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION 
The Respondent stipulates to the allegations of 
jurisdication as set forth in Appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. 
Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in denying 
Appellant's counterclaim or offset against alimony arrearages 
claimed by the Respondent? 
II. 
Did the Trial Court err in not granting Appellant an 
evidentiary hearing on the counterclaim or offset issue? 
III. 
Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in awarding 
Respondent attorney's fees? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent stipulates to Appellant's Statement of the 
Case, as set forth in the Appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Preliminary Statement. 
It is pertinent for this Court to note that this is 
second Appeal filed by Dr. William N. Foxleyf "Appellant", in 
the past year concerning issues arising out of the modification 
of the Divorce Decree entered between the parties. Certain facts 
addressed in the first appeal, designated as No. 890493-CA, filed 
by the Appellant, which is presently pending before this Court, 
are also relevant to the determination of the issues before the 
Court in this appeal. In an effort to fully inform the court the 
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following chronology of additonal facts is submitted. 
1. In 1985, Deanna Foxley, "The Respondent", filed a 
petition to modify the decree of divorce entered between the 
parties. 
2. The Respondent's petition was heard by Judge Moffat 
on March 22, 1988. (The trial transcipt of this hearing is 
designated herein as, "TRl".) The hearing was continued to March 
7, 1989. (The trial transcipt of this hearing is designated herein 
as, "TR2".) (The issues upon which the Appellant has based his 
appeal are not the result of a trial, as such references to 
transcripts herein are to the transcripts of the hearings on the 
Respondent's Modification of the Divorce Decree.) 
3. At the conclusion of the hearing on Respondent's 
petition to modify, the Trial Court ordered the original decree 
of divorce between the parties modified such that the Appellant 
was ordered to pay an increased amount of child support and 
alimony as well as other matters as set forth in the Minute 
Entry of Judge Moffat, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A". 
4. The Appellant filed his first appeal, referenced 
above, with this Court alledging Judge Moffat's modification of 
the decree to have been an abuse of discretion and contrary to 
law. 
5. The Appellant then moved for a stay of execution of 
the judgment rendered by Judge Moffat. Both the Trial Court and 
this Court denied the Appellant's motion for a stay of execution 
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based upon the Appellant's failure to obtain a bond as provided 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. The Appellant failed and/or refused to pay to the 
Respondent alimony as set forth in the modified decree of 
divorce, and also refused to abide by other provisions of the 
modified decree of divorce. 
7. The Respondent, based upon the Appellant's failure 
to comply with the provisions of the modified decree of divorce, 
moved the Trial Court for Judgment for past due alimony and child 
support owed by the Appellant to the Respondent and also 
requested the Court to find the Appellant in contempt for his 
failure to abide by the terms of the modified decree of divorce. 
8. The Trial Court awarded the Respondent a judgment 
against the Appellant for the amount of $9,900.00, attorney's 
fees, plus other relief based upon the Appellant's failure to 
comply with the modified decree of divorce. 
B. Statement of Additional Facts 
With regard to the Statement of Facts as set forth in 
the Appellant's Brief the Respondent alleges that there are 
certain inaccuracies in the Appellant's Brief and that 
additional facts are required so that this Court is fully advised 
of the facts relevant to this case. Accordingly, the Respondent 
submits the following additional facts. 
1. The parties hereto were married on October 8th, 
1976. At the time of their marriage both the Respondent and the 
Appellant were students at Boise State University (Amended 
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Findings of Fact, Paragraph 1; TRl 16:11-25). 
2. Subsequent to the parties marriage they relocated 
Mexico so that the Appellant could attend medical school (TRl 
21-22). 
3. The Respondent was not able to continue with her 
education as a result of the parties relocation to Mexico (TRl 
21:10-12). 
4. In 1980 the parties moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to allow the Appellant to continue his medical studies (TRl 
23:24-25). 
5. During the course of the marriage three children 
were born as issue to the parties (TRl 25:14). The Appellant 
also adopted the Respondent's daughter from a prior marriage 
(TRl 28:13-17). 
6. After the parties relocated to Salt Lake City they 
purchased a home located at 735 Wall Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, from Maurine Hegsted, as as referenced by the Appellant in 
his brief. It is however pertinent for this Court to note that 
Maurine Hegsted is the aunt of the Appellant. 
7. The home was purchased by the parties pursuant to 
Uniform Real Estate Contract with Maurine Hegsted. 
8. On March 23, 1982 the parties hereto obtained a 
redevelopment loan to renovate and remodel the home located on 
Wall Street, as referenced in the Appellant's Brief. Again, 
however, it is pertinent for this Court to note that the home 
located on Wall Street was in substantial disrepair at the time 
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the parties acquired the home and as such it required major 
repairs and renovation tQ make the home habitable. 
91 At the time the parties purchased the home on Wall 
Street, it was approximately 80 years old, was structurally 
unsafe and consisted of only two bedrooms for use by the parties 
and the four minor children. (The financial condition and needs 
of the Respondent are more fully addressed at pages 18 and 19 of 
the Respondent's Brief, in the Appellant's First Appeal, 
referenced above.) 
10f The parties were divorced on or about September 22, 
1983, not on August 22, 1983, as represented by the Appellant. 
Ill The Decree of Divorce provided that the Respondent 
was awarded the marital home on Wall Street, and ordered her to 
assume all obligations thereon. It is pertinent to note that at 
the time of the divorce hearing the Appellant had just graduated 
from the University of Utah Medical School, the parties had four 
young children, the youngest being less than one year old, and 
that the Respondent was without employment and was on State 
assistance. 
i 
12. The Respondent and her children, because of the 
financial condition of the parties, had no other alternative but 
to accept the home on Wall Street, since this was the only 
dwelling available for the Respondent and her minor children in 
which to live. 
13. The original Decree of Divorce, which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B", provided that; 
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The Respondent has an interest in the Appellant's 
Medical Decree, and is awarded the sum of $10.00 
per month as alimony, and at such time as there has 
been a material change of circumstances of the parties, 
the issues of child support and/or alimony may be 
reviewed. 
14. As referenced above, Judge Moffat, after two days 
of hearing on this matter, determined that there had been a 
material change in circumstances and Ordered that the amount of 
child support and alimony in the Decree be modified. Child 
support was increased from $150.00 per month per child to an 
amount consistent with the Child Support Guidelines and alimony 
was increased from the amount of $10.00 per month to the amount 
of $1,350.00 per month. (The Findings of Fact entered by Judge 
Moffat are attached hereto Exhibit "C".) 
15. The Respondent, based upon the financial straits 
which the Appellant left her at the time of the divorce became 
increasingly delinquent in house payments, payment of property 
taxes, as well as in the payment of other of her obligations. 
16. In early 1989 the Respondent offered a deed in 
lieu of foreclosure to the Appellant's aunt, Maurine Hegsted, 
since the home on Wall Avenue was inadequate for the needs of the 
Respondent and her children and because the Respondent was unable 
to afford the costly structural repairs which the home required. 
17. Maurine Hegsted refused to compromise the debt with 
the Respondent and thereafter initiated foreclosure proceedings 
against the Respondent. 
18. The Respondent, as referenced in the Paragraph 10 
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of the Appellant's Statement of Facts, filed for Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy. 
19. The Respondent's bankruptcy was necessitated soley 
because of the Appellant's aunt's foreclosure on the home on Wall 
Street. 
20. The Respondent purchased a new home in May of 1989. 
The new home provided the room necessary for the Respondent and 
the children, and the opportunity for the Respondent to raise her 
children in a safe environment. 
21J The Respondent's decision to purchase the new home 
was, in large part, based upon the anticipated increase in income 
she would recieve from the alimony and child support which the 
Appellant was ordered to pay in the modified decree of divorce. 
22J The Respondent's debts were discharged without 
exception by Order of the Bankruptcy Court, including any 
obligation which the Respondent may have had to the Appellant's 
aunt, Maurine Hegsted, and to the Appellant. (See Exhibit "D" 
attached hereto). 
231 At the time the Respondent moved from the home on 
Wall Avenue she was in arrears in payments to the Appellant's 
aunt, as referenced above. The delinquent payments were not all 
accrued during one period of time, as alluded to in the 
Appellant's brief, but were the result of the Respondent being 
unable to make on time her payments at various times since the 
original divorce. 
24^ The Appellant was current in the payment of 
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alimony, $10.00 per monthf and child support $150.00 per child 
per month from the time of the divorce to the time of the Decree 
was modified by Judge Moffat in 1989. Said alimony and child 
support was inadequate considering the Appellant's increase in 
income from his practice of medicine and the needs of the 
children and the Respondent. 
25. The Appellant, at page 9 of his brief, alleges 
the Respondent had "spent over $4,500.00 on the purchase of an 
airplane instead of paying her property taxes and mortgage 
payments on the marital home". The Appellant has raised this 
same argument before the Trial Court and this Court in his prior 
appeal. The Respondent did not "purchase" an airplane, as the 
Appellant is well aware. The Respondent has never purchased an 
airplane, has never had a pilot's license and never intended to 
obtain a pilot's license. The facts are the Respondent had 
approximately $4,500.00 remaining to her in funds which were 
acquired prior to the parties divorce. The Respondent maintained 
these funds in an account for her and the children for an 
emergency. The Respondent was requested by a friend and asked to 
invest this money in an airplane he owned and told her that if 
she invested with him he would rent the airplane and they would 
derive an income from the rentals which income would be in excess 
of what the money would earn if the money remained in a bank. 
The Respondent was also told that she could have her investment 
returned. The Repondent invested in the airplane in 1985. To 
date she has received no money from the investment and has 
initiated a lawsuit for the return of her money. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Trial Court did not err in denying the Appellant's 
claim for off-set. 
Each of the issues presented by the Appellant in 
his brief concerned alleged errors or abuses of discretion by the 
Trial Court* It is well settled that the Appellant Court will 
review the decision of the Trial Court with considerable 
indulgence and the decision of the Trial Court will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings of the Trial Court, or the Trial Court has 
i 
clearly abused its discretion. Utah Code Annotated, 30-3-5, as 
amended 1953, Adams v. Adams, 593 P2d 147 (Utah 1979), Smith v. 
Smith, 751 P2d 1149 (Utah App. 1988). 
The right of off-set is based upon the principles of 
justice and equity. In the present case the Trial Court 
determined that the equitable remedy of set-off was not 
applicable and that the Appellant's motion for set-off should be 
denied under the circumstances of the case. 
The Trial Court correctly denied the Appellant's motion 
for set-off under the facts of this case. 
II. 
The Trial Court did not err in failing to allow the 
Appellant a hearing on its motion. 
Rule 4-501 (8) of the code of Judicial Administration 
provides that motions may be decided by the Court without a 
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hearing. Rule 4-501 (9), of the Code of Judicial Administration 
provides that the Court may summarily deny a parties motion for a 
hearing. 
The Trial Court, after hearing argument by counsel and 
upon review of the memoranda and other pleadings in this case, 
determined that a hearing on the Appellant's motion was 
unnecessary. 
It was proper for the Trial Court to deny the 
Appellant's motion for a hearing. 
III. 
The Trial Court did not err in granting Respondent's 
motion for attorney's fees. 
The Respondent brought a motion for judgment against 
the Appellant based upon the Appellant's failure to abide by the 
Modified Decree of Divorce. The Trial Court properly took 
judicial notice of the reasonable and customary rate for the 
documents and pleadings in front of it which were necessitated by 
the conduct of the Appellant. 
The Appellant failed to raise an objection to the award 
of attorney's fees in the Trial Court and, as such, the Appellant 
has waived his objection to the entrance of attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE 
APPELLANTfS CLAIM FOR OFFSET. 
A. The Appellant requested by motion that the Trial 
Court grant an off-set against past due alimony owing from the 
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Appellant to the Respondent and also requested the Trial Court to 
terminate all future alimony payments from the Appellant to the 
Respondent. The Appellant1s motions were initially heard on 
November 14, 1989/ by Commissoner Allphen. The Commissioner 
denied the Appellant's motion. Thereafter the Appellant rejected 
the Commissioner's recommendations and the matter was set for 
argument, on February 5, 1990, before Judge Moffat. Both the 
Appellant and the Respondent submitted memoranda, affidavits, and 
other pleadings in support of their respective positions on the 
parties respective motions. Judge Moffat denied the Appellant's 
motion for off-set and to terminate the payment of alimony. 
The Appellant however, at Page 9 of his brief, asserts 
that the "Court's position (concerning the motion for off set) is 
clearly in error and not supported by the facts". This ascertion 
by the Appellant is not supported by any reference to authority. 
The Appellant was given every opportunity, over a period of 
approximately five months, to state a sufficient case but failed 
to adequately do so, and as such the Trial Court denied his 
motion. 
In Utah all aspects of preceedings in divorce matters 
are equitable. Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P2d 1126 (Utah 1974), 
Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P2d 231 (Utah 1971), Utah Code Annotated 
Section 30-3-5, as amended 1953. The Trial Court properly held 
under the circumstances of this case, that the Appellant was not 
entitled to an off-set or that alimony should be terminated. 
Accordingly, the Appellant's argument that there is no 
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basis to support the Court's decision to deny the Appellant an 
off-set is without support on review of the record and is without 
merit in law. 
B. The right of off-set is based upon the principles 
of right, justice and benevolence is a doctrine which equity 
adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in 
justice, equity and good conscience ought to pay it. 80 C.J.S. 
Set-off and Counterclaim §3f page 8. An equitable set-off will 
be allowed only when a party seeking it shows some equitable 
ground therefore, and where such a find is necessary in order to 
promote justice, or to give effect to a clear equity of the party 
seeking it. See, 80 C.J.S. Set-off and Counterclaim §5, page 12. 
In the present case both Commissioner Alphen and Judge 
Moffat determined that under the circumstances the granting of a 
set-off would not promote justice or the principles of equity and 
denies the Appellant's motions. 
C. It is well settled in Utah that in a divorce 
action, absent an abuse of discretion, the Appellate Court will 
not subsitute its judgment for that of the Trial Court. Lord v. 
Shaw, 682 P2d 853 (Utah 1984). In the present case the Trial 
Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant the 
Appellant's motion for off-set and as such the order and judgment 
which is the subject of the appeal should be upheld. 
D. The Appellant cites for the Court in his Brief the 
the proposition that the doctrine of set-off should be addressed 
pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §553 of the United States 
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Bankruptcy Code. 
It is first pertinent to note in this regard that the 
Appellant's Claim against the Respondent was discharged by reason 
of the Bankruptcy Courts granting the Respondent's petition for 
bankruptcy, as referenced above. As such, the Respondent's 
obligation to the Appellant was extinguished. 
Secondly, the principles of set-off in bankruptcy 
actions are similar to those applied in State Court actions. The 
right of set-off is discretionary in the Bankruptcy Court and the 
Bankruptcy Court, in considering the issue of set-off, must 
exercise its discretion under the general rules and principles of 
equity. Brunswick Corp. v Clements, 424 P2d 673 (C.A. Tenn. 
1970). it has been specifically held that an action brought 
pursuant to Sections 11 U.S.C. §553 of the Bankruptcy Code Act, 
is a matter to be determined by the Court using the principles of 
equity. See Givens v. Hall, 569 P2d 1232 (Wash. App. 1977). 
If this matter had been determined by the provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code, the results, considering the equities of the 
case and in the interest of justice, would have remained 
consistent with the ruling of the Trial Court. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO PROCEED WITH PROOF 
CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF OFFSET. 
A^  The Appellant states that the Appellant had a "legal 
right to ascert the claim of the mortgage holder against the 
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Appellant as an off-set". The Appellant did assert a claim for 
off-set and the Trial Court considered the Appellant's claim, 
accordingly, this allegation is moot. 
The Appellant continues by stating; "to deny him (the 
Appellant) a hearing on the issue (of off-set) was error and a 
denial of due process". 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration 
provide that motions, such as the motion of the Appellant which 
is the subject of his appeal, may be decided by the Court without 
a hearing. Rule 4-501 (8) provides specifically: 
"Decision of a motion shall be rendered without a 
hearing unless requested by the Court, in which 
event the clerk shall schedule a date and time 
for such hearing." Emphasis added. 
Even in cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issue therein on the merits with 
prejudice the Trial Court may summarily deny a parties motion for 
a hearing. Rule 4-501 (9) of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Further the issue of set-off was addressed by the 
Appellant's counsel in the November 14, 1988 hearing before 
Commissioner Allphen and February 5, 1990 before Judge Moffat. 
Thereafter, the Appellant filed a Motion for further hearing in 
this issue. As a result of the argument made during the hearings 
and by the memoranda and other pleadings filed in this case the 
Court was fully advised as to the nature of the parties claims. 
Both Commissioner Allphen and Judge Moffat determined that they 
had received sufficient information to be fully advised in the 
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premises and entered their ruling denying the Appellant's Motion 
for off-set. 
The Appellant's allegations on this issue are without 
basis in authority and are without merit. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Judge Moffat, upon being apprasied of the issues of the 
case, determined that the Respondent should be awarded attorney's 
fees of $500.00 against the Appellant. This award was based upon 
the Respondent's Motion for Order to Show Cause and other 
pleadings which were necessiated by the Appellant's failure to 
make child support and alimony payments as well as to abide by 
other Orders of the Court. The Court properly took judicial 
notice of reasonable and customary rate for the documents and 
pleadings in front of it which were necessitated by the conduct 
o f the Appel 1 ant. 
It is also pertinent for this Court to note that the 
Appellant failed to raise his objection to the award of 
attorney's fees in the Trial Court and as he has waived his 
objection to the entrance of attorney's fees. Matters not raised 
in the Trial Court may not ordinarily be considered for the first 
time on appeal. Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P2d 405 (Utah 1977), State 
By and Through Road Commission v. Larkin, 495 P2d 817 (Utah 
1972), Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 375 P2d 456 (Utah 1961) 
The award of attorney's fees by the Trial Court was 
proper and was justified and should be upheld by this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Under the circumstances as presented by this case it 
was reasonable and justified for the Trial Court to deny the 
Appellant's Motion for off-set. The Appellant was not denied due 
process in the Court's failure to allow a hearing in this matter, 
under the rules of practice of the Trial Court. Finally, the 
Trial Court found that the Appellant had not complied with the 
orders of the Court and rendered a judgment in favor of the 
Respondent, and awarded the Respondent $500.00 for attorney's 
fees. The Court award of attorney's fees was proper and should 
be upheld by this Court. 
The Respondent believes this second appeal filed by the 
Appellant is nothing more than a transparent attempt by the 
Appellant to avoid payment of the judgment rendered against him 
by the Trial Court, to avoid the provisions of the Amended Decree 
of Divorce and to continue his scheme to harass to Respondent, 
and as such the Appellant should be found liable for the 
Respondent's reasonable expenses including attorney's fees 
pursuant to Rule 40 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this /Vy day of September, 1990. 
Robert W. Hughes/' 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this £l — day of Septmeber, 
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1990, a true and correct copy of the Respondent's Brief was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Greg S. Ericksen, 1065 South 500 
West, Bountiful, Utah 84101. 
Robert W. Hughes 
5 FOX-2AP.1 
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MAR 2 1 1989 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA FOXLEY 
Plaintifff 
vs. 
W1LLLAM M. FOXLEY, 
Detendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Civil No. 824901591 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing before the Court based on the plaintiff's Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce to seek an increase in alimony and 
child support, and testimony having been taken and evidence 
admitted, argument to the Court having been made, and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises makes this its 
DECISION 
The Court finds that a substantial change of circumstance 
has occured in that the defendant's income has increased since the 
date of divorce from virtually nothing or approximately $50 per 
month to a figure which is not completely clear but which can be 
EXHiBITA 
00052b 
interpreted am being am high mm $224,000 a year and oartalnly una*s 
no circumstances lass than approximately $120, 000 par y*ar« T\im 
Court further finds that the plaintiff has done an admirable job of 
caring lor herself and the children under very adverse 
circumstances and in educating and raising said children. She also 
hau been struggling to obtain her own education to aid in the 
support of the children. The Court finds that the sum of $1,547 
per month is the correct amount for child support and the sum of 
$L,JS0 per month is fair and equitable as alimony. The Court 
further finds that the defendant should be required to provide 
health and dental insurance for the minor children of the parties 
and he is hereby ordered to do so. 
The Court does not find it necessary to invoke the recently 
dec Lared novel theory of "equitable restitution" as enunciated by 
the Utah.Court of Appeals nor is it necessary to invoke the 
provisions of the divorce decree wherein Judge Condor awarded an 
interest in the defendant's medical degree to the plaintiff. The 
Court finds that the change of circumstances above set forth are 
sufficient to justify the award herein without further findings 
regarding the questions relating to the defendant's medical 
degree. Court rinds that attorney's fees should be awarded to the 
plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney's fee is as 
set forth in the affidavits provided by plaintiff's attorneys in 
the sum of $4,394 plus her costs incurred herein. Plaintiff's 
000527 
attorney will draft appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and amended decree toyimplement this decision. 
Dated t h i is J2/ day of March, 1989. 
District/Cou 
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FILMEDI 1
 ^ U c : County Utah 
THOMAS N. AKNIITT, J P . 
At I o r n c y t o r P l a i n t i l l 
900 Ni'Wlloust.' B u i l d i i K j 
10 l ixcharuje P l a c e 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 04111 AA /<7 / *//) /OV^ 
Telephone: (801) 363-r>65(» *^* '* ' '*& • 
IN Tl-IK THIRD JUDICIAL D1STRTCT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
oooOooo 
DEANNA POXLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
WILLIAM N. POXLEY, 
Defendant 
DECREE OP DIVORCE 
Civil No. D82-1591 
-oooOooo-
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge of the above-entitled 
Court, on Thursday, the 10th day of June, 1983, at the hour of 
10:00 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and through her 
attorney, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and the defendant, not appearing 
in person but through his attorney, Rulon R. Price, and the 
Court having heard the stipulations of counsel, having heard the 
sworn testimony of the plaintiff, having received proffers of 
proof from both counsel, having received documentary evidence, 
having heard the arguments of counsel, having reviewed the 
contents of t tie Court's file, and good cause appearing therefor, 
-1- EXHIBITS 
and having heretofore made and entered the Findings of Pact and 
Conclusions of Law; 
NOW, THEREFORE; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore 
existing between the parties are dissolved, and a Decree of 
Divorce is granted to the plaintiff, to become final three months 
from I he date of entry hereof. 
2. That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the four minor children, subject to reasonable rights 
of visitation in the defendant, and while the defendant is 
f et> id mg oufcuiek?—the btafco of—Utah,—U*—*r« awarded telephone 
visitation with the minor children and his mother is awarded 
liberal and fair visitation with the minor children. That both 
parties are ordered to attend counselling concerning their 
rolat ionship with the minor children and for the benefit of the 
minor chiIdren. 
J. That the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff 
child support in the sum of $150.00 per month per child, $600.00 
in the aggregate, through the clerk of the Court, until the 
minor' children reach the age of majority. 
4 4 S 
4. That the plaintiff io awarded an interest in 
defendant's medical degiee, and is awarded the sum of $10.00 per 
Turret' A *± 
m o n t h as a l i m o n y , and t h a t at s u c h t i me as h im Uy t<anct«u*t' s 
(>er,\i A m A rr/r t*j / C / f ^ y t /^v c t tit a *u *> r~*"i < ** 
UHJumo w i l l — b A i j j ^ o i < ii—paying a—gr ou t er—amount—1*4—•*! A»ig»y ,—tM*+ 
O f rA, / *> # Ti i*-r 
p 1 \\ \ rM i k I—Mho 1 4—be ont 4-t led—t-e—*H.H*k» a*ji^ ee-t-eie- aroowrt;—efc- al-tmony 
ftftfhvviy tw+tf &* /feci CLA; **aL 
f-tuw—thu Court» 
5. That the plaintiff is awarded the home of the parties 
located at 735 Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with 
all equity therein, and the defendant is ordered to execute a 
Quit Claim Deed, conveying all of his interest in said property 
io the plaint iff. 
6. That the plaint if J is awarded the 1976 Toyota pick-up 
truck, and the defendant is awarded the 1973 MG Midget automobile, 
and each party is ordered to execute vehicle titles or other 
documents to effect the transfer of said vehicles. 
7. That each parly rs awarded the personal property 
currently in his or her possession, except that the defendant is 
awaided t tie following property currently in the possession of 
the plaintiff: black camera case with contents, silver camera 
case with contents, tripod, o-n larger, antique clock, red 
pettified stump, oak bench, any rifles in the possession of the 
plaint lit, his rocks, minerals and lossiis owned prior to the 
marriage, one-half of rocks, minerals and fossils acquired during 
the marriage, all small antiques including waffle iron, insulators], 
and old lions, walnut coffee table, black rocking ehair# medical 
books and other personal books, two boxes of antique books, and 
the com collection including all paper money; the plaintiff is 
awarded the following personal property currently in the 
possession on the defendant: camping equipment consist inq of 
- I -
two sleeping bags, a Coleman stove, and a Co leman lantern; and 
the tools at^ awarded to the plaintiff for her use for three 
months and then an* ordered divided between the parties, or 
the plaintiff shall give the defendant a $100.00 credit and 
retain possession of the tools. That the furniture be.1onq.Lng to 
t.he plaintiff from prior to the marriage which is in storage JS 
awarded to the plaintiff, and the defendant is ordered to make 
arrangements to convey possession of that property to the 
plaintiff. That t he pI a m t iff • s saving cert ificate consisting of 
money received from the sale of tier home prior to the marriage 
is awarded to the plaintiff. 
tt. That the plaint iff is ordered to assume and pay the 
mortgage arrearages ex isting on the home of the parties and hold 
the defendant harmless therefrom, and the defendant is ordered 
to assuiru? and pay all of his student loans and the Visa account 
and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
9. That both parties are ordered to obtain and maintain 
health and accident insurance* for tire benefit of the minor 
children of the parties if such insurance is available through 
his or her employment . 
10. That the defendant is ordered to obtain and maintain 
life insurance on his lite, if life insurance is available fhrouglji 
his employment: as a group plan with either the minor children as 
beiud • ic tar res or with a bank or similar financial institution I 
as trustee for tin* benef it o( the minor children. 
-4-
OO0083I 
11. That the defendant, is ordered to pay the* sum of 
5 1 /JUO.OO to the plaintiff for her reasonable attorney's fees. 
DATMO this I U day oi 
-^ -V , 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
D ia l . i l i f t Judqt £ . .^f-«_— 
Approved as t o f o 
HUBERT W. HUGHES (1573) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Val ley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Ldke City, Utah 84101 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 4 - 1 0 7 4 
Third JuiiiciAiOt&ttjct 
JUL - 6 1989 
SAL ( LAiiC CuutA i V 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEANNA 
VS. 
WILLIAM 
FOXLEY 
N. 
t ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
FOXLEY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OP PACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. D82-1591 
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
THIS MATTER came on for trial on September 22, 1988, at the 
hour of 2.00 p.m. and was subsequently continued to March 7, 1989 
at the hour of 10:00 a.m. on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify a 
Decree of Divorce before the Honorable Richard H. Moffatt, Judge 
of the above-entitled Court, sitting without jury. The 
Plaintiff, Deanna Foxley, was represented by Robert W. Hughes and 
the Defendant, William N. Foxley, was represented by Greg S. 
Er iclcsen. 
The Court having heard testimony and received evidence, 
argument to the Court having been made, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises is now prepared to enter Its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff and the Defendant were married October 8, 
EXHIBIT C 
1976. At the time of the marriage, the Plaintiff was an 
undergraduate student and the Defendant was a graduate student at 
Ho I tie State University. 
2. The divorce trial was heard on June 30, 1983, a Decree 
of Divorce was signed on August 22, 1983 and entered on August 
23, 1983 t;o become final three months from the time of entry. 
3. At the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff was 
unemployed and had no income and the Defendant was a student and 
had an Income, not including amounts received from student loans, 
of approximately $50.00 per month. 
4. That at the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff had 
expenses of SI,070.00 per month, the Defendant had expenses of 
$895.00 per month. 
5. The Defendant graduated from the University of Utah 
Medic-di School in June of 1983. 
6. During the parties marriage the parties had four minor 
children to wit: Christine, born September 19, 1970. (Christine 
was the daughter of the Plaintiff by a prior marriage who was 
adopted by the Defendant in October of 1980.); Sarah, born May 
23, 1977; Noall, born July 13, 1979; and Corinne, born April 15, 
1982. 
7. During the marriage, the Plaintiff could not pursue her 
lormal education due to frequent relocations of the Defendant in 
pursuing his medical career, because Plaintiff was employed at 
2 
various limes during the marriage to assist in the support of the 
family, and due to the fact that Plaintiff was pregnant for a 
major portion of the time. 
The parties acquired few household furnishings, 
appliances or other personal property during the marriage. 
8. For approximately the two years after the parties were 
divorced, the Plaintiff and the parties minor children required 
and received public assistance. 
9. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has done an 
admirable job of caring for and educating the parties minor 
chiIdren. 
10. The Court finds that the Plaintiff and the minor 
children have endured substantial hardships since the time of the 
d ivurce. 
11. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has made significant 
personal sacrifices to further her education since the time of 
the divorce. After the divorce, Plaintiff obtained her bachelors 
degree in Sociology and expects to receive her masters degree in 
19B9. Plaintiff anticipates pursuing a Ph.D. Length of time for 
*ompiet ion of this course of study will depend on course 
requirements. 
12. The Plaintiff intends to continue with her education in 
an etlort to maximize her income potential. The testimony and 
evidence admitted at trial indicates that the prospects of the 
Plaintiff finding well-paid and full-time employment in her field 
will be difficult without additional education and that even with 
3 
additional education, employment opportunities are projected to 
he limited in the future. 
13. During the year 1987, the Plaintiff worked as a part-
time employee and had a gross income of $9,600.00. 
14. In 1987, the Defendant moved to Winslow, Arizona where 
he is the only medical doctor who specializes in obstetrics and 
gynecology in that vicinity. 
lb. During the year 1987, the last year which the Defendant 
was able to provide a tax return, the Defendant had a gross 
income of $128,437.00. The Defendant's 1987 income was comprised 
of wages he received $16,031.00 as an employee, for approximately 
6 months, at the Hueriy Medical Center in Michigan, and from the 
private practice of medicine. The Defendant earned $112,406.00 
from his private medical practice in approximately 6 months of 
pt'dc t ice . 
16. The earnings of the Defendant as well as his future 
potential have been considered by the court for the purpose of 
determining whether the amount of alimony should be modified. 
17'. The Defendant's present income is not completely clear 
tmr the Court finds based upon the evidence that his gross Income 
tan be interpreted at> being as high as $224,000.00 a year but 
certainly under no circumstances less than approximately 
$120,000.00 per year. 
lb. The Defendant was able to contribute $41,660.00 to a 
Keogh Retirement Plan in 1987 and he anticipated contributing a 
similar amount to a retirement plan in 1988. 
4 
19. The Court finds that there has been a substantial 
change of <: ircumatances In the parties Income since the time of 
t he d lvune . 
20. Based upon the changes of circumstances, a modification 
or the decree of divorce is warranted. The Court does not, 
however, find it necessary to invoke the theory of "Equitable 
Restitution'1 as annunciated by the Utah Courts of Appeals nor is 
i t necessary to the Court to invoke the provisions of the 
original divorce decree, wherein Judge Condor awarded an Interest 
in the Defendant's medical degree to the Plaintiff, since the 
change of circumstances and the needs of the Plaintiff an<A the 
minor children are sufficient to justify a modification of the 
decree. 
21. Based upon the change of circumstances and the needs of 
t lie children, child support to be paid by the Defendant should be 
increased to the appropriate amount reflected in the judicial 
district's support guidelines. 
22. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has an adjusted 
yrobb part-time income of $800.00 per month and that the 
Defendant has an adjusted gross income, after the subtractions of 
his minimum necessary expenses, in excess of $6,985.00 per month. 
23. The proportionate share of the parties combined Income 
is 10* and 90* for the Plaintiff and the Defendant respectively. 
24. The Court finds that based upon the Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's combined adjusted gross incomes, the amount of child 
support per child should be the sum of $607.00 per month for the 
5 
minor children Sarah and Noall and should be the amount of 
$504.00 for the parties youngest child, Corinne, for a total 
child support amount of $1,718.00, monthly, for all three minor 
children. The Defendant, pursuant to the support guidelines, 
should pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $1,549.00 for child 
support. The Court further finds that the amount of child 
support for Corinne should increase to the sum of $607.00 per 
month beginning on April 15, 1989, since she will be 7 years of 
age on that date. Therefore, beginning on April 15, 1989, the 
Defendant's child support obligation will Increase to $1,638.00 
per month, $546.00 per month per minor child. 
25. The Court further finds that pursuant to the support 
guidelines, the child support to be paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff should be decreased by 25% during those periods which 
the Defendant has extended visitation of 25 consecutive or more 
days with the minor chlld(ren). 
26. The Court finds that at the time of the hearing the 
Plaintiff was in arrears in property taxes for her residence in 
excess of $3,000.00 and that the Plaintiff's residence was in 
jeopardy of being sold by the county for back property taxes; 
that the Plaintiff is nine payments behind on her mortgeige 
payments; that the Plaintiff has incurred substantial debts for 
medical, dental and orthodontic expenses for the children; that 
the home where the Plaintiff and the minor children reside is in 
poor condition and is in need of substantial and major repairs, 
including repairs to the roof, foundation, interior and exterior 
6 
wails and plumbing, rebuilding of the back entry into the home, 
as well as other repairs; and, that the Plaintiff and the 
children are in need of new appliances and household furnishings, 
including beds, furniture, a washer and dryer, a stove and also 
new clothing and shoes. 
The Plaintiff is currently living in the same home as 
when the Decree was entered. 
27. The Court finds that at the time of the modification 
hearing, there has been a substantial change in circumstances of 
the parties, that the Plaintiff has a real and substantial need 
for an increase in alimony and that she has endured substantial 
and significant personal hardships since the time of the divorce. 
28. The Court finds that it is just and equitable that the 
monthly alimony to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff 
should be increased from $10.00 to the sum of $1,350.00 per 
month. Payment of alimony to commence as of April 19, 1989. 
29. The Court further finds that the Defendant should be 
required to provide health and dental insurance for the minor 
children of the parties. The Court further finds that it is 
equitable and just that any medical or dental expenses, including 
orthodontic expenses, not paid by health and dental insurance 
should tie divided equally between the parties. 
30. The Court finds that attorney's fees should be awarded 
to the Plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable attorney's 
fees would be the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs incurred 
here in. 
7 
31. The Court finds that that the Plaintiff's Counsel's 
tees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and considering 
the length of time expended and the complexities of the Issues, 
the above award of attorney's fees is reasonable. 
32. That the Court did not consider whether alimony should 
be terminated but would entertain further hearing upon 
application of either party or future petitions for modification. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There has been a substantial change of circumstances 
since the Decree of Divorce was originally entered in this 
mat ter. 
2. It is fair and reasonable, based upon the change of 
circumstances, that the amount of child support to be paid by the 
Defendant should be increased in accordance with the schedules 
set forth in the child support guidelines. 
3. The child support to be paid by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff tor support of the parties minor children should 
increase to the amount of $1,549.00 per month for the three minor 
children. The amount of child support to be paid by the 
Defendant to the Plaintiff for the support of the parties minor 
children should be increased to the amount of $1,638.00 per 
month, $546.00 per child per month, beginning April 15, 1989. 
4. The Plaintiff has endured and continues to endure 
biyn.il: icant and substantial hardships and has made significant 
and substantial sacrifices since the time of the divorce and she 
8 
hat* a significant and substantial need at present and in the 
future fur an increase in alimony. 
5. It is fair and reasonable that the amount of alimony 
Payable from the Defendant to the Plaintiff be increased to 
$l,3ft0.00 per month, commencing April 19, 1989. 
6. The Defendant should provide health, accident and 
dental insurance for the parties minor children and any medical 
and dental costs, including orthodontic treatments, which are not 
paid by medical insurance shall be divided equally between the 
part J es. 
7. It is just and reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded 
attorney's fees in the amount of $4,394.00 plus costs incurred 
herein. 1 
DATED this i day of (L O s V i s ^ ^ 1989, 
PAT 
URT JUDGE 
APPHUV/ED £S TO F0PM: 
Robert W. HuSfyea' 
A 11 ozyiey f ox/iP 1911 n 11 f f 
/ ^\\7/J\S..„ 
i Gretj fc . I Er i clc 
At t o r n e y f o 
MISC:Foxley 
sen 
r Defendant 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT, DISTRICT OP UTAH 
In Res 
FOXLEY, pEANNA S. 
1208 EAS? MANOR CIRCLE 
SALT LAKtf CITY, UT 84124 
DS8AN s $16*58-3049 
Case NO. 89-06741-B 
Da** Piled 11/03/89 
Chapter 7 
DISCHARGE OF DE^TOR(S) 
It is appearing from the record that the above-named debtor is 
entitled to a discharge, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. tfhe debtor is released from all personal liability for debts 
existing on the date of commencement of tl*i» case, or deemed to have 
existed *n such date pursuant to 1348(d) 0* the Bankruptcy Code 
(Title 13-# United States Code). 
2. >ny existing judgment or any judorfant which may be obtained 
in any cc?urt with respect to debts descritfad in paragraph 1 is null 
and void ** * d^t^rmiT^tiwv ol p%t%ont\ \iakvLv^f ^t tk% 4&&t&?, 
except: 
*) Debts determined nondischargeabJ* by the 
Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 1523(a)(2), 
(4) and (6) of the Bankruptcy CO&*t and 
p)Debts which are nondischargeabl* pursuant to 
§523(1), (3), (5), (7), (8) and (9) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
2. £his order does not affect any pending complaint to have a 
debt declared nondischargeable pursuant to 1523(a)t2), (4) and (6) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, nor does it prohibit filing of a complaint under 
S523(a)(*)# (3), (5), (7), (8) and (9) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
4. All creditors are prohibited from attempting to collect any 
debt that has been discharged in this casl* 
5. £y virtue of §525 of the Bankruptcy Code, no government unit 
or private employer may terminate the employment of or discriminate 
with respect to employment against the debtor solely because relief 
\iaa sought, ixv t&% Bai&r\X£t»c? Court,* 
Dated: February 20, 1990 JUDITH *• BOULDEN, BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
TRUSTEE: HARRIET E. STYLER 
•XH 
SCHEDULE A-3 CREDITORS HAVING UNSECURED CUIPIS WITHOUT PRIORITY Page 3 
Mane of creditor [including last known 
holder of any negotiable instrument] and 
I complete •ailing address including zip 
code 
Specify when clain was incurred and the consideration therefore 
when claim is contingent, unliquidated, disputed, subject to 
setoff, evidenced by a judgment, negotiable instrument or other 
writing, ©r incurred as partner or joint contractor so 
indicate; specify name of any partner or joint contractor on 
any debt. 
Indicate if claim 
is contingent, 
unliquidated, or 
disputed 
Amount 
of 
Claim 1 
4. Loan Servicing Center 
Drawer 99175 
Ft. Worth, TX 76199-0175 
5. Perkins HDSL Loan Program 
University of Utah 165 SSB 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
6. Noly Cross Hospital 
1045 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
8. ZOU 
2200 South 900 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84137 
9. Mervyns 
P.O. Box 4916 
Hayward, CA 94540-4916 
10. William Noall Foxley 
P.O. Box 818 
Winslow, A2 86047 
11. Dudley Amoss 
255 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
12. Rubers & Odette Sayler 
P.O. Box 808 
Grassrange, HT 59032 
13. Redevelopment Agency of SLC 
285 West north Temple, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
14. Pristine Fox ley 
1206 East Manor Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
15. Discover Card 
P.O. Box 56005Q 
Pasadena, ZA 91186-0058 
Student loan, 9/84. 
Student loan, 9/84 
Medical services, 8/88. 
Merchandise sold on open account, 5/89. 
Merchandise sold on open account, 6/87. 
Claim arising from hold harmless provisions *# divorce 
decree, granted in 1982. 
Legal services, 2/89. 
Personal loan, 5/1/89. 
Redevelopment loan, 6/83. 
Personal loan, 5/89. 
Merchandise sold on open accour:, i/S8. 
Contingent, unliquidated 
disputed. 
8,500.00 
4,710.00 
250.00 
500.00 
175.00 
30,000.00 
450.00 
2,500.00 
5,GOO.00 
T 500.00 
50C.00 
Tctal A-3 S3- IS5. 
